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State responsib¡lity for human
r¡ghts violations associated with
climate change
M a rg a reth a Wewe ri n ke - Si n g h
lntroduction
Inrernarional human rights law is prímafacie relevant to climate change because climate change
and its associated impacts have an adverse effecl on the enjoyment of internationally recognised
human rights. Indeed, the link between climate change and human rights has been articulated
in multilateral forums, by various human rights treaty bodies, and by the Conference of the Par-
ties (COP) ro rhe United Nations Framework Convention on Ciimate Change (UNFCCC)'1
Notably, however, in the various statements of international bodies linking climate change with
human rights, no reference is made to'violations'of human rights.This raises questions about
the premise that the purpose of human rights law is,to quote the European Court of Human
zugilts (ECIHR),'[ro guarantee] not rights that arc theoretical orillusory but rights that are
practícal. and effeclive' .2
This chapter demonstrates how existing norms of international law can be employed to
establish State responsibility for acts and omissions that lead to dangerous climate change and
associated violadons of human rights, or for human rights violations resulting from measllres
to respond to climate change.3This is done throughananalysis of the law of State responsibil-
ity; the nature of States' obligations to prevent human rights violations and to take measures
to ensure the realisation of human rights at home tnd abroað; and questions related to causâ-
tion and proof of damages.The conclusion elaboïates on the potential role of the law of State
responsibiliry in strengthening the legal protection offered by international 1aw to peoples and
individuals affected by climate change.
State respons¡bility for human rights violations
assoc¡ated with climate change
The law of Srate responsibiliry is important, for answering 1egal questions related to climate
change and human rights because it contains'the general conditions under international law
for the State to be considered responsible for wrongfi.rl actions or omissions, and the legal con-
sequences which flow therefrom'.a This general law buiids on the doctrine expressed by the
Permanent Court in the Factory at Chorzów case that'it is a principle of international law, and
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even a general conception oflaw, thatany breach of an engagement involves an obligation to
make reparation''sToday, the law of State responsibility is såted authorirativ"ly in the,Articles
on the Responsibilicy of States for Internationally'Wrongful Acrs' ('ARS) jroduced by the
International Law Commission (,ILC').6
The relevance of the general rules of State responsibility to human rights obligations has
been expressly and widely recognised by international human rights bodies,T and examples of
cases where human rights bodies relied on these ru-les for the interpretation of human rights
treaties are increasingly numerous.s Academic literature similarþ ,r'rgg"rr, that the law of State
responsibility and international human rights 1aw are murually reinãrcing.e From an interna-
tional human rights law perspective, the right to a remedy is a substantive right. This right is
protected under customary inteïnational lawl0 and expressed in human rights treaties in various
forms'l1The right to a remedy exists not orúy ex poitfactobut also when there is a threat of a
violation'12Accordingly, the general law of Staie resporxibili ty canbe understood as providing a
structure through which redress for human rights violations canbe obtained by States on behalf
of the victims of the violation, or directly by victims themselves.
Esta blishÍng state responsÍbÍlÍty
The law of State responsibiliry is based on the principie of independenr responsibility of States.
This principle basically means that each State is respãnsible for its own conducr. The principle
follows from the constituent elements of an internationally wrongf;l act of a State listed in
Article 2 oî the ARS, which states that a State has committed an internationally wrongfirl act
when an action or ornission:
is attributable to the State under international law;and
constitutes a breach of an internationai obligation of the state.13
Whether or not certain acts or omissions are attributable to a State is determined by reference
to the rules on attribution.These ruies exist because states can rcrely,if ever, guarântee the con-
duct of all private persons or entities on its territory.la It is important to ger to grips with these
rules for the purpose of establishing State responsibility for climate change-r.trted conduct that
alfects the enjoyment of human rights:after all, alargepart of the gr".rrho,rr. gases that cause
climate change are emitted by entities other than sirt"r, corporarions that exploit fossil fuels,
utility companies that produce electriciry enterprises that manufa.trrr" prod.rcts, airlines and
car companies that a1low travel, and producers and consumers -ho srrppiy and demand theseproducts and services.
The ru-les on attribution âre expressed inArticles 4-11 of theARS.The general rule of attri-
bution is contained inArticle 4 (entiried'Conduct of organs of a State'), *hirh provides that
[t]he conduct of any organ shall be considere d an act of that State under international law,
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive,judicial or any other functions, whatever
position it holds in the organisation of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of
the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.15
The Commentaries claúfy that the reference to a State organ in Article 4 extelds to organs
ofgovernment'of whatever kind or ciassification, exercising *irt.uer functions ,and atwhateverlevei in the hierarchy''16This rule operates similarly, if not identically, in international human




State responsibility for violations
Covenant that were attributable to central government and its legislature, federal governments,
municipal authorities, judicial authorities, police and security forces and various rypes of Stare
agents.lTThe type of conduct that is generally attributable to a State âs a consequence of these
rules includes national legislation, decisions of the judiciary or administrative measures.ls
It is worth emphasising that the general rule of attribution reflected inArticle 4 of theARS
allows orn-issions to be attributed to States (that is, afathure on the part of the State's organs or
agents to carry out an international obligation).1e The Commentaries to the ARS stress that '[c]
ases in which the international responsibility of a State has been invoked on the basis of an omis-
sion are at least as numerous as those based on positive acts, and no difference in principle exists
between the two'.20 Further, the Commentaries claúfy that whethe r an act of a State involves an
act ot an omission,'ffihat is crucial is that a given event is sufficiently connected to conduct .. .
which is attributable to the State.'2l
The scope for attribution is extended even further through the rule that an internationally
wrongful act may consist of several acß and omissions that cumulatively amount to â breach
of obligations.zz In theARS, this is expressed inArticle 15 which states that State responsibil-
iry can arise from a'breach consisting of a composite act',23 The breach has to extend over the
entire'period'starting with the first of the actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long
as these actions or omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity with the international
obligation'.2a
Together, these rules on attribution suggest that a contextual analysis of a State's conduct and
the obligations by which it is bound is the most appropriate method for determining whether a
human rights violation has occurred. Such an analysis could take âccount of a range of conduct
as attributable to the State - from information reported to the Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC to its national legislation and regulatory framework, energy subsidies, trade policies
and the extent of assistance provided and received in accordance with technology transfer and
financial obligations - to determine whether this conduct is in accordance with its international
human rights obligations.The sections below set out the standards against which such conduct
should be analysed.
The scope and nature of states' human rights obligations
related to climate change
Before discussing the scope of States' obligations under international human rights iaw, it is
important to consider the sources from which these obligations emerge.The key point to high-
light in this regard is that ali States are bound by a wide range of human rights obligations that
demand the protection of civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights.
First ofall, the UN Charter contains more than a dozenreferences to human rights,proclaims
the realisation of human rights as one ofthe main purposes of the organisation and provides that
Member States shall cooperate to take joint and separate action with the UN to promote respect
for and observance of human rights.25 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
can be understood as an authoritative interpretation of the substantive rights referred to in the
UN Charter.26W'idely ratified human rights treaties provide addi¡ional human rights obligations
for States. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)'??
has 168 State parties, which include all States listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC, and dozens
of States located in areas where climate change is forecast to have serious negative impacts on
human life and livelihoods.zs The vast majority of States have also ratified the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),2e with 164 State parries.3OThe
number of ratifications of international human rights treaties has risen rapidly in recent years,
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with all UN Member States having ratífied ât least one core human rights treaty and 80 per cent
having r:Ltífied four or more.3lThe effect of the consolidation of human rights norms thror"rgh
various sources of international law is that the norms contained in the UDHR are applicable
across different fields of internâtional law as customary norms binding on all States.32
As regards the interpretation of human rights treaties, we must note that the emphasis is, in
Nowak's words,'[e]ssentially ... on interpreting treaties ...in the light of their object and pur-
pose'.33 And for human rights treaties, the main object and purpose is guaranteeing the enjoyment
ofthe rights protected in those treaties.3aAs discussed below, this presses in favour of a broad inter-
pretation of the substantive human rights that are afFected by the adverse effects of climate change.
OblÍgotÍons to prevent human ríghts violatÍons
Perhaps the most important human rights obligations in the context of climate change are
obligations to take measures to prevent future harm. Such obligations are important not only
to prevent ormitigate a range of adverse effects of climate change that wou-ld affect the eryoy*
ment of human rights, but also to allow for the establishment ofState responsibiliry for climate
change-related human rights violations that might already be occurring as a result of past emis-
sions.This section peruses an analysis of States'obligations related to the right to life as protected
under Article 6 of the ICCPR and numerous other human rights instruments to illustrate the
scope and nature of these obligations.
In its General Comment No.6 on the Right to Life;the HRC states explicitþ that the right
to life 'is a right which should not be interpreted narrowly'.3s This reflects the position of al1
regional and internâtional human rights bodies with respect to the scope of the right to life. For
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACIHR) has stated that the
fundamental right to life includes, not only the right of every human being not to be
deprived of his life arbítraúly,but also the right that he will not be prevented from having
access to the conditions that gaarantee a dignified existence.s6
And in SERAC u Nigería,theAfrican Commission on Fluman and Peoples'Rights (ACHPR)
found a violation of the right to life based on'unacceptable'levels of 'pollution and environ-
mentâI degradation'.37 Commentetors understand the right as protecting the ability of.each
individual to 'have access to the means of survival; rcaitze fu1l life expectancy; avoid serious
environmental risks to life; and to enjoy protection by the State against un\ryârranted depriva-
tion oflife'.38
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR generates two categorics of obligations: a prohibition of the
arbítrary deprivation of life, and an obligation to take positive measures to ensure that right,
including measures to ensure its protection in 1aw.3e As regards the obligation to take iegisla-
tive measures, the HRC has found that the law's protection is required against a wide variety
of threats, including infanticide committed to protect a woman's honour,aO killings resulting
from the availability of firearms to the general public,al and the 'production, testing, possession,
deployment and use of nuclear weapons'.42 At the European level, the ECTHR similarly holds
that the States'legislative and administrative framework must protect against a wide variety of
threats to human life,a3 including environmental damage.aa It seems safe to assume that in a simi-
lar vein, climate change-related threats must be mitigated through effective legislation in order
to protect human life. According to Nowak, a violation of the obligation to protect the right
to life by law can be assumedowhen State legislation . . . is manifestly insufficient as measured
against the actual threat'.a5
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However, the positive obligations of States under the right to iife go beyond an obligation
to take legislative measures.a6 For example, the HRC has taken the view that the right requires
that States take'measures to reduce infant mortality ancl to increase life expectancy, especially
in adopting measures to eiiminate malnutrition and epidenrics'.a7 Moreover, it has slressed that
these positive obligations wiil only be fully met if States protect individuals against violadons
by its agents as well as violations committed by private persons or entities likeþ to prejudice
the enjoyment of Covenant rights.a8 In a similar vein, the IACTHR found in the landmark
case Wlásquez Radríguez u Hond.wrasae that State responsibility {or the violation had arisen 'not
because of the act fof abduction and killing] itsel{ bur because of the iack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention'.50 This line ofjurispru-
dence suggests that States are obliged to take measures to prevent human rights violations result-
ing from the actions ofprivate persons that cause climate change, including fossii fuel companies
and other polluting industries.sr
ECtHRjurisprudence, starting with Osman u UK,suggests that the srandard of care required in
relation to a risk, of which the State had actual or presumed knowledge, is one of reasonableness:
The Court does not accept ...rhat the failure to perceive the risk to liG in the circumstances
known at the time or to take preventive measures to avoid that risk must be tântâmount to
gross negligence or wilfr;l disregard of the duty to protect hfe. . . . Such a rigid standard must
be considered to be incompatible wirh the requirements of fthe right to life]. . . . [H]aving
regard to the [fundamental] nature of [the right], it is sufficient for an applicant to show that
the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a rcaI and
immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have know1edge.52
Actual or presumed knowledge of the climate change-related risks may arise from the UNF-
CCC, the reports of the IPCC and other scientific studies, as well as from affected communities'
efforts to draw attention to these risks.
The case of Thtar C. u Roumanle53 illustrates the overlap between States'obligations to prevent
human rights violations and'due diligence'obligations arising from the precautionary principle
as embodied in international environmental law, including the UNFCCC.s4 In its ruling, the
Court stressed that even in the absence of sciencific probability rcgarding a causal link, the exist-
ence of a'serious and substantial'risk to health and weli-being of the applicants imposed on the
State 'a positive obligation to adopt adequate meâsures capable of protecting the rights of the
applicants to respect for their private and {ami|y hfe and, more generally, to the enjoyment of a
healthy and protected environment'.55
States'prevention obligations under international human rights law may however go fur-
ther than panllel 'due diligence'obligations under international environmental law. It is clear
from the interpretative practice of human rights bodies that States are not only obliged to
assess potential risks to human life, but must also respond to any'serious and substantial' risk
with measures 'designed to secure respect' for human rights, and 'capable of protecting lthose
rights]'.56 In other words, States do not have the discretion to prioritise policy objectives such as
the protection of particular industries over mitigation and other response measures that would
averl the serious and substantial risks posed by climate change to human life. Moreover, these
response measures must themselves be compatible with States'obiigations to respecl and ensure
human rights. This means, amongst other things, that all States must reconcile obligations to
prolect peoples and individuals against the adverse effects of climate change with co-existing




Through their focus on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities (CBDRRC), the UNFCCC and its associated instruments encourage States to fir1fi1
their human rights obligations by taking science-based mitigation measures without perpetuat-
ing existing inequalities. Although the principle of CBDRRC applies exclusively ro relarions
between States, it shares with international human rights law the objective of achieving sub-
stanlive equality.sT The lack of legally binding emission reduction commitments in the recentþ
adopted ParisAgreement underscores the importance of substantive human rights obligations to
mitigate climate change in a manner that is fafu and equitable.At the same time, the Paris Agree-
ment provides a procedural framework that could shed light on States'compliance with these
human rights obligations. The reference to human rights in the Preamble of rhe Agreement
could catalyse further information on, and review of, the overall human rights implications of
States' mitigation actions.
ObligatÍons to ensure the realísotíon of human
rÍghts at home ond obrood
In addition to obligations to prevent future harm, international human rights law imposes obli-
gations on States to ensure the progressive realisation of human rights within the State's own
territory as well as internationally.This section discusses such obligations and their relevance in
the context of climate change, taking the right to health as an example.5s
The right to health, as protected under Article 1"2 of the ICESCR and numerous orher
human rights instruments, is a right that States are obliged to progressively realise. The Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has emphasised that although'the
right to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy',se it nonetheless creates States'
obligations.60 These obligations are understood as including'immediate obligations. . . [to] . . .
guarantee that the right will be exercised without discrimination of any kind'and to take steps
'towards the full tealization'of the right that'must be deliberate, concrete and targeted towards
the full realization of the right to health'.ól
To clari$' the content of States' obligations, the CESCR has used a respect-prorect-fulfiI
typology of obligations that arise from the right to health.62 Ir undersrands the obligation to
'respect' the right as 'an obligation of States to respect the freedom of individuals and groups
to preserve and to make use of their existing entitlements'.63The CESCR has interpreted the
right to health as requiring respect for the right to heatth of a people within a State's rerritory
and in other States,6a entailing an obligation'to refrain from unlawfirlly poiiuting air, water and
soil, e.g. through industrial waste from State-owned facilities'.65 Accordingly, the right could be
violated by actively engaging in'activities that harm the composition of the global armosphere
or arbitrarily interfere with healthy environmental conditions'.66 Moreover, the CESCR has
explicitþ stated that the right to health obliges States to ensure rhât inrernational insrruments,
presumably including climate change-related agreements, 'do not adversely impact upon the
right to health'.67
The obligation to protect the right to health involves 'rhe preservation of existing entitle-
ments or resource bases', including through regulation,68 in accordance with the UN Charter
and applicable international law.6e States must accordingly adopt measures against environmental
and occupational health hazardsT} and national policies to reduce and eliminate air,water and
soil poIlution.71 Moreover, States must prevent'encróachment on the land ofindigenous peoples
or vulnerable groups',72 'ensure food availability, regulation of food prices and subsidies, and
rationing of essentials while ensuring producers a fair price',73 and prevent private enterprises
from engaging in environmental pollution'especiaily that which conraminates the food chain' .7a
80
State responsibility for violations
In the context of climate change, the right to health also appears to entail an obligation to
regu-late private âctors in order to achieve and uphold emission limitation and reduction stand-
ards,Ts and to adopt and implement'laws, plans, policies, programmes and projects that tackle the
adverse effects of climate change'.76
The CESCR further directs that States must give'suffìcient recognition to the right to health
in the national political and legal systems, preferably by way of legislative implementation' ,77 and
must allocate'a sufficient percentâge of a State's available budget . . . to the right to health'.78This
illusrrares what the CESCR describes as the obligations to 'firlfil'the right to health;a positive
obligation that is triggered'whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their
control'to enjoy the right'by the means at their disposal'.7e It basically requires that the State'be
the provider', which 'can range anywhere from a minimum safety net, providing that it keeps
everyone above the poverty line appropriate to the level of development ofthat country, to a ftill
comprehensive welfare model'.80 Again, this obligation has an extraterritorial dimension: States
are required to'facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other countries,
wherever possible and fto] provide the necessary aídwhen required'.81 In the context of climate
change,this is interpreted as an obligation on high-income States to facilitate access to essentiâi
health services as well as assistance to adapt to climate change in low-income States.8z
The parallel obligations of developed States contained in Article 4 of the UNFCCC and
reafiìrmed in the Paris Agreements3 could serve as a bottom l-ine in the interpretation of these
obligations. And again, the procedural framework established under the Paris Agreement could
serve ro shed light on compliance with these obligations. The Agreement specifically requíres
developed States to communicate information related to the fulfilment of their finance obliga-
tions, while other States providing resources are encouraged to communicate such informa-
tion.sa This information is to inform the global stocktâking process aimed at reviewing States'
'collective progress towards achieving the purpose of [theAgreement] and its long-term goals',85
including the goals of 'fm]aking finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low green-
house gas emissions and climate resilient development'and'[i]ncreasing the abiiity to adapt to
the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas
emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production'.86 To meet these
goals and fulfil parallel obligations under international human rights law, developed States would
need ro scale up funding to assist developing States in taking the resilence-buiiding and adapta-
tion actions required to ensure the realisation of human rights'87
Legal consequences of state respons¡b¡l¡ty
When a State actualTy violates its human rights obligations, State responsibilicy is established
'as immediately asbetween the two [or more] States'.88This rule indicates that the legal conse-
quences of State responsíbility arise automatically once a State violates a human rights obliga-
tion, irrespective of whether any victim of the violations actively seeks a remedy for the damage
or harm suffered.This section spells out the legal consequences of an internationally wrongfirl
act, ofrce it occurs.
CessatÍon of wrongful conduct
The basic principle governing the 1egal consequences of wrongfül conduct (or what the ARS
call the 'content' of State responsibility) is that a State that commits an internationally wrong-
firl act'must, so far as possible, wipe-out a1l the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish
the situation which wouid, in all probabiliry have existed had that âcl not been committed'.8e
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The emphasis on restoring the situation to what it was before the wrongful act was committed
refl.ects the broader objective of compliance with obligations, which is emphasised in the ARS
through the codification of the continued duty of performance,eO and of the duty to cease the
wrongfi,rl act (if it is ongoing)el in two sepârate articles.Together, these provisions make it clear
that the law of State responsibiliry is not a liability system with the primary or exciusive goal
of providing injured persons with compensation. The Commentaries further emphasise that
compliance with existing obligations is a prerequisite to the restoration and repair of the legal
relationships affected by the brcach.ez The duty of cessation further comprises an obligation to
offer appropriate assurances and guarântees of non-repetition where the circumstances require.e3
International human rights law similarþ recognises that adequate and effective remedies for
violations 'serve to deter violations and uphold the legal order that the treaties create'.ea The
duty of cessation has been characterised by the HRC as 'an essential element of the human
right to a remedy' that entails an obligation 'to take measures to prevent the recurrence of a
violation', including through changes in the State Party's laws or practice if necessary.e5 The
ACHPR's findings in SER 4C u Nigeria illustrate that in the human rights context, the duty to
offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non*repetition may reinforce existing procedural
rights; when violating a range of human rights, Nigeria had incurred 'secondary' obligations to
provide'information on health and environmental risks and meaningfirl âccess to regulatory and
decision-making bodies to cornmunities likely to be affected by oil operations'.e6
The consequences for States that incur these types of obligations based on climate change-
related wrong{irl conduct could be drastic, particularþ where the violation involves not a single
act,but a series of wrongfi.rl acts and omissions.To meet its obligation of cessation,a State may
need to make changes to significant pârts of its laws, regulatory system and levels of assistance
requested from, or provided to, other States in ordpr to restore compliance with the substantive
obligation that was violated. For example, a State may need to withdraw fossil fuei subsidies,
adopt new regulations and policies to phase out fossil fuels, and bring all existing regulations and
policies in line with emission reduction goals that reflect its highest possible ambition as well as
CBDRRC.eT \n a simiiar vein, a developed State might be under an immediate obligation to
scale up funding for mitigation, adaptation and capaciry-building actions in developing States to
restore compliance with its human rights obligations.
RealÍsing víctÍms' right to ø remedy
The second set of obligations arising from an internationaily wrongfil act centre around an
obligation to make fiíl reparations for the injury caused by the wrong{ìrl act.e8 Injury is under-
stood as including any material or moral damage caused by the acfe and includes'the injury
resulting from and ascribable to the wrong{ì.rl act'rather than'any andúl consequences'fl.ow-
ing flom it.1o0This makes it clear that there must be a link bet'uveen the wrongful act and some
injury in order for there to be an obligation of reparation. However, the causal requirement
inherent in the link is not the same in relation to every breachl0l and can be established even
when the wrongfi.rl conduct was only one of several factors that contributed to the iqjury.1O2
'Where the obligation breached relates to the prevention of harm, the link benveen injury
and the breach is likely to involve consideration of the extent to which the harm was a reason-
ably foreseeable consequence of the action taken.103 Based on the reports of the IPCC,input
from affected communities and the definition of'climate change'inArticle 1 of the UNFCCC,
a broad range of climate change-related risks and harm could be considered as reasonably fore-
seeable consequences of climate change and the human activities that arc known to cause it.As
far as evidential requírements âre concerned, the principle of effectiveness may require shifting
82
State responsíbility for violations
at least part of the risk of uncertainty to the State where it can be established with a reasonable
degree of certainry that specific irr,lrry has occurred as a result of gfobal warming.loa Moreover,
asWbrksman suggests, the correiation between greenhouse gas emissions, atmospheric chemistry
and global warming has probably
been demonstrated with suflicient confidence that it seems unlikely that an adjudicator
would require a complainant, in order to obtain relief, to demonstrate what would not be
possible - that a specific emission of greenhouse gâses by State S directþ caused the specific
impact in State I.105
All this meâns that existing evidence may we11be sufücient to substantiate claims for repara-
tion for climate change-related State conduct that constitutes a violation ofinternational human
rights law.As the science of attribution evolves,the chances that the victims of such wrongf,rl
conduct will be able to ascertain their entitlement to reparations should further increase. [n
addition, where State responsibility is invoked through individual complaint procedures under
human rights treaties, victims have usually been identified in a claim's admissibility stage. In such
cases, a link befween State conduct and the individual's situation will already have been estab-
lished once the case reaches the reparations stage.106
Once the duty to make fu1l reparations has been triggered, the scope of the iqjury has to
be established.This will be a fact-sensitive exercise which will require significant interpretation
of complex evidence related to risks and probabilities. However, the law of State responsibility
does provide some clear road signs for determining the nature and amount of reparations due.
The first is the principle that no reduction or attenuation of reparâtion will be made for any
concurrent causes.107The duty to make reparâtions is similarþ unaffected by a responsible State's
ability to pay,los or by a claimant's inability to determine the quantity and value of the losses suf-
fered.lOe In other words, the duty of the responsible State to make íull reparations for the injury
is unqualified in general international law.110
The understanding of the right to a romedy as a substantive human right implies that the
focus of the duty to make reparations for abrcach ofinternational human rights iaw lies squareþ
on restoring the rights of victims,insofar as victims of the violation can be identified.Where
it is not certain whether an individual qualifies as a victim of the breach, uncertainty could be
addressed in accordance with the human rights princíple in dubio pro libertate et dþnitate.Fur-
thermore, irrespective of whether victims can be identifìed, the content of the obligation must
reflect the aim of re-establishing the status qüo anteJll The wide range of remedies awarded for
human rights violations (including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and measures of
satisfaction such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repefition and, more
importantly, changes in relevant laws or practices) reflect the potential for constructing remedies
for climate change damage that are consistent with human rights objectives.ll2These remedies
should materialise through bottom-up processes: individuals and communities affected by cli-
mate change themselves are in the best position to identify and develop suitable remedies for
violations of their human rights. Thus, in cases where a State plans to invoke the law of State
responsibility on behalf of affected communities, consultative processes will be needed to ensure
that rcparation claims accurately reflect the demands of those communities.
Concluding remark
This chapter has demonstrated that States'obligations under international human rights law
could provide a basis for State action in the context of climate change, as well as for State
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responsibility claims related to climâte change and associated human rights violations. In a
nutshell, international human rights law requires climate action that not only reflects States'
maúmum efforts to combat climate change, but also leads to a fair distribution of mitigation
anó adaptation burdens at local, domestic and global levels. Moreover, ali States must take meas-
ures to prevent human rights from being violated in the context of response measures.The law
of State responsibility is automatically triggered once a State breaches âny of these obligations.
'\üVhether a State has breached its human rights obligations through climate change-related
conduct needs to be established on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the effects ofits
conduct on the enjoyment of human rights at home and abroad and the foreseeability of those
effects. Hereby the States''obligations under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement could be
taken as bottom lines for human rights obligations related to international cooperation and
assistance.ll3
Once a breach of obligations has occurred, the responsible State must first and foremost
restore compliance with the obligations that were violated. In other words, a State whose leg-
islative framework or conduct is not in accordance with a human rights obligation incurs an
obligation to bring its laws and practices in line with the relevant obligation. M'oreover, the State
must take meâsures to prevent future breaches of the obligation.And where the unlawfirl con-
duct - such as a State's failure to take adequate measures to prevent loss oflife associated with the
adverse effects of climate change - has actually caused harm, the State also incurs an obligation
to make firll reparations for the injury.These reparations must be directed to the beneficiaries of
the obligation, which usually means the victims of the human rights violation.
The scope and nature of appropriate remedies might be relatively eâsy to establish where
the violation concerns localised damage to individuals or communities, such as harm resulting
from land grabbing or the exclusion of vulnerable cornmunities from adaptation prcgrâmmes.
However, where the unlawfi¡l conduct relates to the impact of climate change per se on the
enjoyment of human rights, the severity and scale of damage and the virtually limitless number
of potential victims will trigger difficult questions related do causarion, proof and victimhood.
These questions will be complicated by the fact that multiple States might be responsible for the
same damage.In such cases, the effectiveness of the law of State responsibility is hinged on the
extent to which States cooperate to give effect to the victims'right to a remedy and to restore
the rule of law.'With liability and compensation excluded, at least for now, from the scope of
the'W'arsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change,lla it would
seem opportune to explore the role of human rights bodies in facilitating such cooperation.
Meanwhile, the human rights community could work with affected communities to develop
guidance on the types of remedies that might be appropriate for varioús climare change-related
human rights violations.
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